Latest Posts

A registry-only supply chain attack on @velora-dex/sdk delivers an architecture-aware macOS backdoor that fires the moment your code imports the package. No install hooks, no repo commits, no visible output.

StepSecurity's AI Package Analyst and Harden-Runner detected the compromise of axios, the largest npm supply chain attack on a single package by download count, before any public disclosure existed. What followed was a race against a state-sponsored threat actor who actively deleted GitHub issues to suppress the warning, a decision to host a community call at midnight that drew 200 attendees, and coverage from Bloomberg to Andrej Karpathy

Hijacked maintainer account used to publish poisoned axios releases including 1.14.1 and 0.30.4. The attacker injected a hidden dependency that drops a cross platform RAT. We are actively investigating and will update this post with a full technical analysis.

TeamPCP weaponized 76 Trivy version tags overnight. The KICS attack followed the same playbook days later. One security control is not enough. Here is how the StepSecurity platform's ten independent security layers work together to prevent credential exfiltration, detect compromised actions at runtime, and respond to incidents across your entire organization before attackers can succeed.

A supply chain attack targeting Solidity and Web3 developers has been discovered across three IoliteLabs VSCode extensions (solidity-macos, solidity-windows, and solidity-linux) embedding obfuscated backdoors that download remote payloads and establish persistence on all major platforms. StepSecurity is actively investigating this incident and will publish a full technical analysis with IOCs and remediation guidance shortly.

On March 27, 2026, TeamPCP injected a WAV steganography-based credential stealer into two releases of the telnyx Python SDK on PyPI. The issue was disclosed in team-telnyx/telnyx-python#235. TeamPCP is the same group behind the litellm supply chain compromise three days earlier, identified by a shared RSA-4096 public key, identical encryption scheme, and the tpcp.tar.gz exfiltration signature present in both attacks.

On March 24, 2026, a critical supply chain compromise was identified across two litellm releases on PyPI. The issue was disclosed in BerriAI/litellm#24512.

All release tags in the Checkmarx/kics-github-action repository have been compromised with an infostealer payload. If you are using this Action pinned to any version tag, treat your CI/CD secrets as compromised and rotate immediately.