Update, November 17, 19:55 UTC: Optimizely has confirmed the incident. Its status page says an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation and added malicious JavaScript to some customer projects, and a spokesperson told Gizmodo the flaw was in the account signup flow. Optimizely says it has fixed the flaw and removed the injected code. Scott Helme has also published the full list of affected organizations. We have revised this post to match, and corrected earlier statements about the loader, the exposure window and the wallets. Later on November 17 we added Optimizely's fuller statement, the first responses from affected companies, a lower estimate of what victims lost, and more attacker infrastructure. We also corrected the TRON row of the wallet table, which wrongly described outgoing transfers as incoming.
On November 16, 2026, an attacker injected malicious JavaScript into the Optimizely Web projects of 178 organizations, including CNN, BBC, Fox News, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, HSBC, KLM and IKEA. Optimizely's CDN served it, so every visitor to an affected site loaded it. The payload swaps copied crypto wallet addresses and steals card numbers from checkout forms. Helme's analysis says it also loads the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits on iPhones and iPads.
Helme found the code in 188 of the 1,611 Optimizely snippets he checked. The attacker wrote it into each project's Project JavaScript field, a custom-code field that runs on every page. The rest of each snippet was untouched, and the CDN served the file with Optimizely's own certificate. A write-up by Amirul Cyber named the campaign OPTIMJACK.
We checked the public scan records, DNS and WHOIS, the live payload and the attacker's wallets. Since we first published, three things have changed:
- Optimizely says the flaw is fixed. It removed the injected code from affected projects, ended active sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected accounts, and says it has notified all affected customers. Helme found one snippet still infected at 21:52 UTC on November 16 and says every file was clean by 23:11 UTC.
- The payload server is down. The registry put
1688360[.]ccon hold at 00:37 UTC on November 17, and it no longer resolves. - The attacker has emptied the wallets. The LTC, ETH, BTC and TRON wallets were emptied between 04:11 and 05:39 UTC on November 17. One more LTC payment arrived at about 10:18 UTC.
Action required: Block 1688360[.]cc, webshell[.]lol and the .icu hosts in the IOC table, and search logs back to 04:00 UTC on November 16. If you use Optimizely Web, read the Project JavaScript field of every project. Searching the served snippet for 1688360 is not enough, because one loader variant hides the URL in base64. Check snippets served from your own domain too.
Who Was Affected
Helme's write-up lists all 178 organizations and the domains involved. Banking and finance is the largest group with 32, then technology and SaaS with 23 and retail with 20. It also names streaming (12), news and media (10), airlines and travel (9), telecoms (7), crypto and trading (6) and insurance (6). Examples include Zoom, BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. Optimizely's own sites were affected too: the snippets for www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com carried the loader.
We checked this against public urlscan.io data. Between 08:28 and 21:23 UTC, 76 scans of third-party pages, across 30 domains, recorded a request to 1688360[.]cc. For 17 of those domains, urlscan stored the payload itself: the exact file with SHA-256 f7b84b9a…, served with HTTP 200 to a page on the site between 17:57 and 21:23 UTC. They are:
- News: CNN, BBC and Fox News.
- Software: Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, Hootsuite and Smartsheet.
- Airlines and retail: Air France, KLM, American Eagle, American Girl, Scheels and Stamps.com.
- Insurance and housing: Mutual of Omaha and two property-management portals (
loftliving.comandmanagebuilding.com).
The other 13 domains in the scan data also recorded a request, but urlscan has no stored copy of what they were served. We confirmed the loader chain on two pages. On a GitLab page, a consent manager (cdn.cookielaw.org) loads cdn.optimizely.com/js/5113954737848320.js, and that file loads 1688360[.]cc. On a Mutual of Omaha page, cdn.optimizely.com/js/25010540072.js requests track.js directly.
Affected companies have said little so far. Salesforce told reporters it is investigating unauthorized changes to Optimizely scripts on some of its sites, has disabled Optimizely scripts in preview and production as a precaution, and will notify customers if it finds unauthorized access to their data. Optimizely says it has notified every affected customer, so if you run Optimizely Web and have heard nothing, ask.
How the Attack Works
Each Optimizely Web customer loads a JavaScript snippet from Optimizely's CDN, usually at /js/<project ID>.js. The snippet holds Optimizely's code, the customer's experiments and an optional Project JavaScript field. The attacker wrote their loader into that field in customer projects, so the file still came from cdn.optimizely.com. Helme says this was not CDN cache poisoning: the CDN served exactly what it was given. Some customers serve the snippet from their own domain, and Helme names opt.scheels.com and www.vodafone.com.au. Those were affected too, because the content comes from the same project.
Helme saw three versions of the loader. Most snippets carry a plain script tag for https://1688360[.]cc/track.js. A second version hides the URL in base64 and decodes it with atob(), so a search for 1688360 does not find it. Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned at one point and then re-infected with this version, which Helme reads as the attacker still having access at that moment. The third version carries a full inline copy of the payload that runs through eval if 1688360[.]cc is blocked. Blocking the domain is therefore not enough. The code has to come out of the project.
Helme's timeline puts the first injection at 04:21 UTC on November 16, when a BBC snippet began loading code from webshell[.]lol, a domain he ties to the same actor. 1688360[.]cc was registered at 05:23 UTC, and the first public scan to record a request to it was at 08:28 UTC. Mass clean-up ran from about 20:40 to 21:10 UTC, and one snippet, which The Register names as TalkTalk's, was still infected at 21:52 UTC. Helme says every file was clean by 23:11 UTC. For most sites the exposure window was about 16 hours.
Optimizely says it blocked the vulnerable path and deployed a fix, removed the injected code from affected projects, ended active sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected user accounts, and blocked code from being delivered in Cloudflare. It has said the flaw was in the account signup flow. It has not said how that gave the attacker write access across unrelated customer projects, and Helme asks the same question.
The payload is one JavaScript file of about 30 KB with three independent blocks and an iOS branch. We read the final version as text and did not run it.
Crypto address swapper
The script holds replacement addresses for ETH, TRX, BTC, TON, SOL, LTC, BCH and DOGE. It only swaps an address that passes the chain's checksum, so the replacement is valid and the victim's wallet will accept it, and only when nearby text contains a payment word such as wallet, deposit or send.
It rewrites addresses in page text, form inputs, link and image attributes, copy events, the clipboard API, navigator.share, and the URL and body of fetch and XHR requests. It also replaces Function.prototype.call and apply, so a string that looks like a wallet address is rewritten before it reaches any function.
Because it hooks the copy event, an address copied from an affected page can already be swapped when you paste it into a wallet app. Check the address on your wallet or hardware-wallet screen against the one you meant to use, not against what you copied.
Screenshot and cookie exfiltration
After the first swap on a visible element, the script loads html2canvas.min.js from the payload server, captures the visible page as a JPEG, and POSTs it to /hit.php with the page URL, up to 8,000 characters of document.cookie and up to 20 of the original addresses. This happens once per page load and only after a swap, so a visitor who never handles a wallet address does not send cookies. HttpOnly cookies are out of its reach.
Card skimmer
A second block wraps fetch and XHR and listens for form submits. It looks for a card number that passes the Luhn check and has a known brand prefix, a valid expiry date and a three- or four-digit CVV, and sends them with the page URL to /card.php using navigator.sendBeacon. Helme dates its addition to 13:43 UTC. It does not collect the cardholder name or billing address, and it cannot read card fields inside a cross-origin payment iframe. It also stores each captured card in sessionStorage under a key that starts with cc_ so it does not send the same card twice, which leaves card data in the victim's browser storage.
iOS second stage
If the user agent is an iPhone, iPad or iPod, the script adds two boot.js scripts from .icu hosts. On iOS 18.6 or earlier it also adds a hidden iframe that loads /JIUJIU888/weifile.html. Helme's analysis identifies the chains: Coruna for iOS 13 to 17 and DarkSword for iOS 18.x, plus a separate iOS 26 chain that only fingerprinted the device when he looked. He reports that the kit's own comments list iOS 18.7.3 and later, and 26.3 and later, as patched, and that pages on iOS 18.6 or earlier reload every 60 seconds to retry the exploit. We did not retrieve or analyze these files ourselves.
What We Found
The payload changed 26 times in a day
Helme counts 26 builds of track.js on November 16, starting at 08:10 UTC. urlscan's captures show the decoded size growing from 28,877 bytes at 16:02 UTC to 29,461 at 16:19, 29,871 at 17:34 and 30,430 at 18:11, where it stayed. The final version went live at 17:56 UTC. The server sends cache-control: max-age=15, so the operator can swap the file within seconds.
The hash in Amirul Cyber's write-up (f7b84b9a…) is the final version, and its Last-Modified header reads 17:56:07 UTC. urlscan's first capture (617df364…) is a different file. Match on behavior and domains, not on one hash.
The iOS infrastructure was in use before this campaign
The .icu domains were registered in three batches:
l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icuon October 28, behind Cloudflare.5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu,p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icuandje4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icuon November 9 at 17:52:42 UTC. All three resolved to34.96.213.201in Hong Kong.eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu,1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icuandgm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icuon November 16 at 16:38:42 UTC. All three resolved to34.87.36.58in Singapore.
Three domains created in the same second and hosted on one IP address are one operator's batch. Public scans show 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu serving /A8/a.html on November 12, four days before this campaign. Helme ties the same actor to an earlier wave through other third-party scripts from November 13, and to the webshell[.]lol injector since September 17. We have not verified that link.
The domain q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icu, which Helme listed, did not exist at 22:07 UTC on November 16. It was registered at 23:44:57 UTC, about three hours after he published it, and now sits behind Cloudflare. We do not know who registered it. Hudson Rock also lists ios-hack[.]icu, which we confirmed was registered at 23:39:51 UTC, five minutes earlier, and which also sits behind Cloudflare. Both were registered before the registry held 1688360[.]cc, which suggests the operator was preparing replacements.
Other script vendors were poisoned earlier
A separate investigation by Hudson Rock and an independent researcher found poisoned scripts from three other providers and ties them to the same infrastructure. Archived responses show a poisoned analytics script from Kissmetrics on securitybank.com at 05:42 UTC on November 13, a poisoned widget from StorifyMe on faz.net at 20:31 UTC the same day, and a poisoned video loader from minute-ly on foxsports.com at 16:25 UTC on November 16. Earlier responses on the BBC site loaded webshell[.]lol/get.js, and both the webshell[.]lol and 1688360[.]cc chains connect to iOS routing infrastructure with the same channel code, 02111110.
The authors are careful about what this shows. It does not establish four independent vendor breaches or prove a single operator, and the times are when someone observed the scripts, not when the intrusions began. It does show that the November 16 Optimizely wave was not the first use of this infrastructure. We have not checked these archives ourselves.
The payload server has been taken down
1688360[.]cc was registered at 05:23:08 UTC on November 16 and pointed at 136.113.106.136, a Google Cloud address in us-central1. The registry put it on clientHold at 00:37 UTC on November 17, and it now returns NXDOMAIN. Helme says the registry put webshell[.]lol on hold at 03:37 UTC, and it returns NXDOMAIN too. As of 19:51 UTC, eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu and gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu no longer return an address, and the registration record of the first was updated at 16:20 UTC. 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu and je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu resolved to 34.96.213.201 until the afternoon. They returned no address by 19:51 UTC, and their registration records were updated at 16:38 UTC. We cannot tell from public data whether the registrar or the operator made that change. l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu is still behind Cloudflare. No new public scans of affected pages appeared after 21:23 UTC.
The wallets were emptied by morning
Helme's write-up puts the attacker's take at $7,040 as of 19:25 UTC on November 16, including stablecoins on TRON and BSC, and reports an earlier sweep of those at 13:03 to 13:05 UTC. The USDC on Ethereum went to a HitBTC deposit address. We checked the addresses on public block explorers at 07:30 UTC on November 17. The LTC, ETH and BTC addresses were empty. The TRON address was emptied too: 546.8 USDT went out on November 16 at 13:05 UTC, and the last 116 USDT and the 169 TRX went out on November 17 at 04:13 and 05:24 UTC.
At 19:51 UTC the LTC address still held 1.7065 LTC, about $75, that arrived at about 10:18 UTC. That is six hours after the sweep and ten hours after the payload server went down. It fits someone paying a swapped address that they copied earlier, but we cannot confirm that. The BTC and TRON addresses were still empty and the ETH address held only dust.
Other estimates of the victims' losses are lower. Alex Thorn of Galaxy Digital puts the total victims sent at about $2,300 and says most of the Bitcoin looks like the attacker's own funds routed through an exchange back to their wallet. We cannot confirm that. The address received 0.0853 BTC in five transactions. The largest, 0.0761 BTC, arrived in a transaction with 20 outputs, and the first, 0.0053 BTC, in one with 15. Batched outputs like that are typical of an exchange withdrawal, which fits either reading: a victim withdrawing to a swapped address, or the attacker cashing out.
| Chain | Received | Swept | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| BTC | 0.0853 BTC | November 17, 05:39 UTC | Five receipts between 11:13 and 19:57 UTC on November 16. One at 13:18 UTC paid 0.0761 BTC in three outputs. All seven outputs went out in one transaction. |
| LTC | 17.02 LTC | November 17, 04:11 UTC | Three receipts between 15:24 and 16:39 UTC on November 16. A further 1.7065 LTC arrived at about 10:18 UTC on November 17 and had not moved as of 19:51 UTC. |
| ETH | 0.0745 ETH | November 17, 05:23 UTC | Includes 0.0192 ETH received on November 12 and a 1 gwei transfer on November 15, both before the domain was registered. |
| TRON | 662.9 USDT and 183.7 TRX | November 16 at 13:05 UTC (546.8 USDT); November 17 at 04:13 UTC (116 USDT) and 05:24 UTC (169 TRX) | In use since March. The last 116 USDT went to an address that also received cash-outs on March 24 and November 3. Empty as of 19:51 UTC. |
| TON, SOL, BCH, DOGE | 0 | None | No transactions on any of the four addresses. |
Balances and transfers from BlockCypher and Trongrid.
The TRON wallet has been in use since March, which fits Helme's reading that this actor was active before this campaign. We confirmed that the last 116 USDT went out on November 17 to an address that also received cash-outs from this wallet on March 24 and November 3, which Helme says ties the actor to earlier attacks. The money is a small part of the damage. Stolen cookies, card data and any iOS compromise leave no trace on-chain.
Why the Usual Defenses Miss It
- The site's own code is clean. The change is in a vendor-hosted file, so code review and repository scanning never see it.
- A consent banner does not help. In the GitLab scan the consent manager is what loads the Optimizely bundle. It controls when the script runs, not what the script contains.
- Subresource Integrity is hard to apply. A snippet that changes whenever a team publishes an experiment cannot be pinned to one hash.
- Content-Security-Policy helps, with one exception. A host allowlist in
script-srcblocks the download oftrack.js, and aconnect-srcallowlist blocks the exfiltration. A policy that usesstrict-dynamicwith a nonce does not, because it trusts scripts that a trusted script adds.
What To Do Now
- Block the indicators. Add
1688360[.]cc,webshell[.]loland the.icuhosts to your DNS and proxy blocklists, and search logs back to 04:00 UTC on November 16. - Read your Optimizely projects. Open the Project JavaScript field of every Optimizely Web project you own. Do not rely on searching the served snippet for
1688360: one variant hides the URL withatob()and another carries the payload inline. Check snippets served from your own domain as well. - Review account access. Optimizely says the attacker came in through the account signup flow. List the users and API tokens on your Optimizely account, remove any you do not recognize, and ask Optimizely which of your projects were modified, when, and through which accounts. Optimizely says it has notified all affected customers, so check the contacts on your account for a notice.
- Look for blocked requests. Check CSP reports and browser telemetry for failed requests to the payload server. Those are pages where the loader was present.
- Protect payment pages. Remove third-party tags from checkout where you can, and use the payment provider's hosted fields in a cross-origin iframe, which this skimmer cannot read.
- Treat exposed cards and wallets as compromised. If staff or customers entered card details or copied a wallet address on an affected site between about 04:00 and 21:00 UTC on November 16, replace the card and verify wallet addresses on a hardware-wallet screen.
- Update iOS devices. Treat iPhones and iPads on iOS 18.6 or earlier, and any device still on iOS 17 or earlier, that visited affected sites in that window as candidates for forensic triage.
Still unknown: how the attacker turned the signup-flow flaw into write access across unrelated customer projects, who is behind it, and whether any device was actually compromised through the iOS chains. Public scans show the exploit pages being delivered, not an exploit succeeding. Optimizely's status page still showed the incident as monitoring at 19:51 UTC on November 17. We will update this post as those points are confirmed.
Indicators of Compromise
Sources are marked in each row. “Our analysis” means the payload review, DNS and WHOIS checks and wallet checks described above. “Helme” and “Hudson Rock” mark details we have not reproduced.
| Type | Indicator | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Domain | 1688360[.]cc | Payload and exfiltration host. Registered November 16 at 05:23:08 UTC. On registry hold since November 17 at 00:37 UTC and no longer resolves. |
| Domain | webshell[.]lol (/get.js) | Injector Helme ties to the same actor. First seen September 17. Loaded from a BBC snippet from 04:21 UTC on November 16 (Helme). Put on registry hold at 03:37 UTC on November 17 (Helme) and returns NXDOMAIN as of 19:51 UTC. Link to the same actor not verified by us. |
| URL paths | /track.js, /html2canvas.min.js, /hit.php, /card.php | Loader target, screenshot library, cookie and screenshot exfiltration, card exfiltration (our analysis). |
| Loader variants | Script tag for 1688360[.]cc/track.js in projectJS; the same URL in base64 decoded with atob(); a full inline copy of the payload with an eval fallback | Found in the Project JavaScript field of customer projects (Helme). |
| IP address | 136.113.106.136 | Last A record for 1688360[.]cc. Google Cloud, us-central1. |
| SSH host key | 5e:7a:7f:b3:d7:22:ba:c7:f5:04:5a:b2:5c:0d:8a:73 | ed25519 fingerprint Shodan recorded on 136.113.106.136 on November 5. Useful for finding sibling servers. |
| Domains (iOS stage) | eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu, gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu | Registered November 16 at 16:38:42 UTC. Resolved to 34.87.36.58. No address returned as of 19:51 UTC on November 17. |
| Domains (iOS stage) | 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu, je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu | Registered November 9 at 17:52:42 UTC. All three resolved to 34.96.213.201 until the afternoon of November 17 and returned no address as of 19:51 UTC. The second has the TXT record ppck-ver=eaf775e3f8fa03179b5761fa5cca1ecb. The third was reported by Hudson Rock, and we confirmed its registration time and address. |
| Domains (iOS stage) | l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu, q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icu, ios-hack[.]icu | The first was registered October 28. The second, listed by Helme, was registered November 16 at 23:44:57 UTC, after he listed it. The third, reported by Hudson Rock, was registered at 23:39:51 UTC. All three sit behind Cloudflare. |
| IP addresses | 34.87.36.58, 34.96.213.201 | Google Cloud in Singapore and Hong Kong. Hosted the .icu domains above. |
| URL paths (iOS stage) | /boot.js, /JIUJIU888/weifile.html, /JIUJIU888/index.js, /A8/a.html | Seen in the payload and in public scans of the .icu hosts. The data-channel-code value is 02111110. |
File hashes (track.js) | 617df364120adc47fb4f55dcc0c69a9b6c9e108a92c60bc2b64a266254ab02f3f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40c2a34c579e4c2e8802752c93b3a9cca0230610f3e4dd6688f4272459c7c7c162 | The first is urlscan's first capture (28 KB). The second is the final version, live from 17:56 UTC and also in the Amirul Cyber write-up. Helme counts 26 builds on November 16. The third is the decoded inline fallback that Hudson Rock found, identical in BBC and HSBC UAE snippets. Not verified by us. |
| Browser artifacts | window._k7, window._cc, window._qxc, window._shot; sessionStorage keys starting cc_; non-native Function.prototype.call and apply | Left in the page by the payload (our analysis). |
| Network behavior | POST of type text/plain to /hit.php; beacon to /card.php with fields n, e, c, u | Exfiltration requests (our analysis). |
| Wallets | ETH 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884eBTC 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kWLTC ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5TRX THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxaTON UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09pSOL FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5nBCH qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58DOGE DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5 | Replacement addresses hard-coded in track.js. They match the list in the Amirul Cyber write-up. The BTC, LTC and ETH addresses were emptied on November 17. The LTC address received a further 1.7065 LTC at about 10:18 UTC. |
References
- Optimizely: Web Experimentation Security Incident (status page)
- Scott Helme: World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely
- Scott Helme on X: thread on the breach
- Amirul Cyber: OPTIMJACK write-up
- Gizmodo: Sprawling Malware Attack Reportedly Affects Zoom and Other Major Brands (Optimizely's statement)
- BleepingComputer: Optimizely hack infected CNN, Fox News, BBC, Salesforce sites with malware (Optimizely and Salesforce statements)
- Cointelegraph: Hackers inject credit card, crypto-stealing malware into 178 major websites (Galaxy Digital's analysis of the stolen funds)
- The Register: Optimizely hack turns world's biggest websites into malware dispensers (the snippet still infected at 21:52 UTC)
- InfoStealers: Beyond Optimizely: Malicious Scripts Traced Across Four Web Services (Hudson Rock analysis)
- urlscan.io: scan of
1688360[.]cc/track.jsand scan of a GitLab page - Reddit r/cybersecurity: first report of the script on gitlab.com and foxnews.com




